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ABSTRACT
The paper attempts to demonstrate that all of the perpetrators of 
the grave terrorist attacks in Europe in the recent years have been 
connected—by one or maximum two links—to the center and leadership 
of ISIS in Syria, from whom they received ideological, logistical and 
financial support—thus contradicting the popular theory of lone wolves. 
The author reaches the conclusion that in many cases addressing potential 
lone radicals on Jihadist forums before the attacks was nothing else but 
a special form of Psyop, with the goal of disrupting counterrorism efforts 
and spreading fear in societies.
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INTRODUCTION
The 9/11 terrorist attacks forced everyone to face the question: how 
did the unthinkable happen? How could one of the most prepared 
secret services in the world fail so tragically? Looking for the answer 
to that question brought forward–if only briefly–the issue of mapping 
and analyzing the mechanics of terrorist networks. It is essential for 
counterterrorism organizations to unravel the web of connections 
between terrorist branches and cells. Although services are certainly 
making the swiftest possible progress in that respect, there are hardly 
any comprehensive studies available. Alternatively, to be fair, there are 
considerably less of them than those investigating the stages of lone 
radicalization and the options for preventing it.
After 9/11, renowned researcher and hands-on expert on legal social 
and institutional networks, Valdis Krebs, attempted to compile the 
web of connections between the perpetrators and define the most 
typical features of illegal networks.1 Marc Sageman, in his work on terror 
networks, points out that we must dispel the common stereotype that 
“terrorism is a product of poor, desperate, naïve, single young men from 
third world countries, vulnerable to brainwashing and recruitment into 
terror.”2 The author illustrates how these elastic and efficient “small-world” 
networks form a topology of self-organizing “nodes” and “hubs.” The 
communication model of Al-Qaeda was composed of vertical channels 
running towards the leadership colonized by horizontally proliferating 
nodes and hubs. The terminology may vary, but this model shows distinct 
similarities to the model by Krebs and, as we will see, to the real-world 
practice of the Islamic State. Krebs draws his conclusion from a 2001 
analysis: “To win this fight against terrorism it appears that the good guys 
have to build a better information and knowledge sharing network than 
the bad guys.”3 This, however, is easier said than done. Even more so, 
since in recent years, in respect to the terror attacks carried out by the 
Islamic State, the concept of the “lone wolf” overshadowed the network 
aspect in terrorism-related public debate and even expert analysis.
LONE WOLVES?
In light of the recent devastating terror attacks on Europe, the main 
question is whether the seemingly solitary perpetrators actually acted 
alone. Is it possible that, in the majority of these cases, the investigation 
came to a halt when, after a major attack, it failed to unravel the chain 
of actors through which the perpetrator received communications and 
logistics support? Illegal networks naturally follow different principles 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss2/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1668
56Journal of Strategic Security
© 2018 
ISSN: 1944-0464 
eISSN: 1944-0472
The Legend of the Lone Wolf
from those guiding legally operating institutional-social matrices. Yet 
the majority of this information is barely available to researchers. Krebs 
basically worked from journals, archives, and courtroom records–with the 
caveat that a piece of data is considered legitimate only if it is confirmed 
by at least two reliable sources.4
On August 21, 2015, on the Thalys TGV en route to Paris, 25-year-old 
Moroccan Ayoub El Khazzani opened fire on the passengers, wounding 
one of them severely with a knife. Besides the Kalashnikov, the attacker 
carried a semi-automatic handgun and a bottle of gasoline. American 
soldiers who happened to be travelling on the train subdued him. Even 
though the perpetrator, upon returning to Europe from Syria, appeared 
on the radar of several services as a dangerous radicalist, his movements 
were not under strict surveillance. In his defense, he claimed that he had 
been starving and homeless in Belgium, he had only wanted to rob the 
train, and he had found the weapons in a park. Authorities conducting 
the proceedings were accused of disregarding the presumption of 
innocence. Even official statements failed to confirm the attacker’s 
connection to Jihadist terrorist organizations. “Right now, we can only 
establish remote connections between Khazzani and the Islamic State 
or its operative elements. What we know, however, is that he arrived in 
Europe simultaneously with Abdelhamid Abaaoud,” said Jean-Charles 
Brisard, head of the Paris Centre d’Analyse du Terrorism (CAT), even 
though his comprehensive study, published in the winter of 2016, could 
lead one to the polar opposite conclusion.5 Here, with a focus on the 
francophone networks, I will build on his and his co-author’s data-rich 
work in attempting to demonstrate the strong ties between the seemingly 
solitary Thalys attacker, Abaaoud (a key figure in the Paris and Brussels 
attacks) and, via Abaaoud, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) 
high command itself.
Were the ties actually as weak as acting authorities may have believed 
at first and even second sight? We need not go farther than CAT’s own 
database, which Jean-Charles Brisard and his co-author, Kevin Jackson, 
used in their work. This study uses data partially based on information 
received from the Hungarian Counter Terrorism Centre and draws on the 
rich collection of terrorist profiles compiled by Emma Webb and Robert 
Sutton.6 All we have to do is collect publicly available data, examine details, 
which may seem unimportant at first, and connect the dots to gain a clear 
understanding of the strong ties between the aforementioned actors.
El Khazzani arrives in Hungary via the Balkan refugee route in the summer 
of 2015, as shown by the records of the Hungarian Counter Terrorism 
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Centre. His friend and fellow fighter Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who was a 
head of the ISIS command for external operations in Syria, also arrived 
back in Europe disguised as an asylum-seeker. Abaaoud was not only a 
strategist and perpetrator of the terror attack on the Bataclan Theatre in 
Paris, but for a long time, a supervisor for various operative terror cells 
and a liaison between francophone units and the leadership in Syria. In 
addition, Khazzani had connections to a Bilal Chatra from Algeria, who 
also entered the registry in Hungary, and followed orders by Abaaoud 
in June-July to survey the Balkan route, the level of border control and 
possibilities for illegal entry. On his way, Chatra keeps informing Abaaoud 
and El Khazzani of waiting times and potential paths. They launch small 
groups of terrorists disguised as refugees. Abaaoud and El Khazzani stay 
at the same hotel in Budapest in early August, only to part ways on the 
4th and depart Hungary in different directions. The terrorists stay at hotels 
nearby the Eastern Railway Station. Abdeslam found accommodation 
at a Rákóczi Street apartment, Hotel 30, while three of his companions, 
including another Bataclan attacker, Mohamed-Aggad, spent seven days 
at Hotel Central King under falsified documents issued for Jamal Salah, 
Fooad Moosa, and Husein Alkhlf. Abaaoud and El Khazzani, who arrived 
together, stayed at Swing Hotel Budapest.
Following our network approach, it is advisable to look into, as much as 
possible, Abdelhamid Abaaoud’s background story. Naturally, this study 
uses only information known to the services and available for public 
research. The data helps us draw–although with numerous white spots 
remaining–the network which shows us how many steps, how many links 
actually separated these assumedly solitary, isolated perpetrators from 
the central command of ISIS.
As we know from several sources, in Syria, 2013, a brigade emerged 
within the ISIS operative center for organizing attacks on Europe with the 
aim of uniting various groups of French and Belgian radicalists into the 
Katibat al-Muhajireen, or Muhajireen Brigade (KAM). Its members lived 
and fought in the same units. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
built its external ISIS operations on such strong personal ties that often 
originated in Europe instead of Syria. Many of them were members of 
the same cell at home, and many were preparing for their return from the 
moment they arrived, and therefore stayed away from social media. The 
first commander of KAM came from the same “gateway group,” Sharia 
4, as Abaaoud or Najim Laachraoui, bombmaker of the Paris attacks and 
bomber of Zaventem Airport. 7
Abaaoud was the liaison between the ISIS command in Syria and the 
Verviers network (named after a small French town), the members of 
which returned to Europe via Turkey and Greece in 2014. This was the 
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first widespread network equipped with a safe house, weapons, and 
chemicals. Two of its members participated in establishing the training 
center in Sabratha, Libya, together with Abaaoud and ISIS spokesperson, 
later supreme commander, and al-Adnani. Incidentally, this was also the 
unit, which gave the attackers of the Bardo National Museum and Sousse 
Beach in Tunisia.
How many steps do we need to take us from seemingly solitary El 
Khazzani to al-Adnani? We need exactly one: Abaaoud himself. According 
to Belgian courtroom records, Zaventem Airport was originally a 
target for the Verviers cell (even though Ibrahim El Bakraoui and Najim 
Laachraoui carried the attack out one year later). El Bakraoui faced 
charges as early as 2010 for firing an AK-47 assault rifle at a police officer. 
The final planning phase of the Brussels attack may have gained speed 
when police arrested Abdeslam.8 Yet the fact that one of the mobile 
phones used by Abaaoud in Greece contained sketches of a bomber 
pushing a trolley with the captions ‘Zaventem’ and ‘Arrival’ indicates that 
selecting the target itself was far from a blind or rushed decision.
Among the highest-ranking commanders of external ISIS operations was 
Belgian-born Abu Ahmad (also known as Osama Atar). He is a veteran 
Jihadist, former training officer from Rakka with multiple prison sentences, 
who, after his release due to a robust media campaign, travelled to 
Syria. He is the one whom testimonies refer to as “the coordinator of 
refugees.” He is a cousin of the Brussels attackers, the Bakraoui brothers. 
He is mostly responsible for logistics, such as providing the departing 
operatives with false documents. The person overseeing the infrastructure 
of external operative units is Abu al-Faransi, a former member of the 
French Foreign Legion and an active participant in public beheadings.
Another one of Abaaoud’s friends was the attacker of the Brussels 
Jewish Museum, Mehdi Nemmouche, who was widely considered a “lone 
wolf” until his connection to Abaaoud was unveiled. When Nemmouche 
arrived in Syria in December 2012, Abaaoud was already in charge of the 
KAM. Similarly to Zaventem bomber and Paris bombmaker Laachraoui, 
Nemmouche previously worked for the ISIS secret service, Amniyat, and 
in Aleppo, they were both involved in guarding and assumedly abusing or 
even murdering Western and local prisoners.
Nemmouche departed for Europe together with a certain Ibrahim 
Boudina. A member of the so-called Cannes-Torcy cell, Boudina travelled 
to Syria in 2012 and returned to France in 2014 equipped with a bomb-
making manual, a contact list, instructions for secret communications 
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and extensive funds. Before his arrest in France, his primary targets were 
the Charlie Hebdo office and Nice. He did not carry out either event. The 
Kouachi brothers perpetrated the former, members of an operative cell, 
which sent three fighters to Falluja in 2004, when the city was under 
the command of al-Qaeda leader at the time, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 
In prison, Cherif Kouachi built strong ties with some key figures of the 
European al-Qaeda network. Among them was Djamel Beghal, who was 
preparing to attack the Paris US Embassy in 2001. Beghal’s mentor was 
Abu Hamza al-Masri, who had recruited Richard Reid, the infamous shoe 
bomb attacker as well as 9/11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui. In prison, 
Kouachi also met Amedy Coulibaly, perpetrator of Hypercacher Kosher 
Supermarket massacre, who was also planning attacks on Paris Jewish 
schools. They later travelled together to visit Beghal in Murat. Incidentally, 
the Charlie Hebdo attackers had been on the USA surveillance list for 
years, as there was reliable intelligence on their al-Qaeda training in 
Yemen.9 The investigation following the Nice terrorist attack revealed 
that the attacker, Mohamed Bouhlel, had received communications from 
the Kouachi brothers earlier. The French Minister of the Interior later 
referred to Bouhlel as a “quickly radicalized, solitary perpetrator,” who 
was turned radical by his divorce and financial difficulties. An article in 
British newspaper The Telegraph published a similar description. On 
NBC News, the Paris prosecutor claimed that there was no evidence that 
Bouhlel had had direct contact with any terrorist organizations. Later, it is 
learned that Bouhlel had been to Tunisia several times – the last occasion 
was only eight months prior to the Nice attack–where one single link, a 
mutual fellow combatant separated him from the Tunis commander of the 
al-Nusra Front.
Walid Hamam arrives in Greece as a Syrian “refugee.” Before that, 
in Lebanon, he is a member of the same unit as al-Adnani. A further 
co-combatant is Mohamed-Aggad, one of the attackers of Bataclan. 
Mohamed-Aggad arrives in Hungary on 9 September. There, he meets 
Abdeslam, who, as we know, has made four rounds between Syria and 
Europe, three of them through Hungary. Abdeslam collects the Paris 
attackers in Budapest and the small Hungarian village of Kiskörös.
We can see that these francophone perpetrators belonged to operative 
cells that had returned from Syria and had received their training 
from KAM. Which is not to say that their difficult childhood or family 
background could not have contributed to their internal process of 
radicalization. However, from a counterterrorism perspective this has 
no bearing on the fact that not one of these combatants fits the profile 
of a “lone wolf”–neither is it true that local Islamist cells or communities 
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recruited or radicalized them. None of them was further away from ISIS 
command and control than one link in the chain.
Nevertheless, we should also take a closer look at the Berlin attack of 
December 2016 from this aspect.10 The perpetrator, Anis Amri, flees 
Tunisia after a successful escape from prison, and arrives in Europe in 
April 2011. He is 19 at the time, but he claims he is 16. In the refugee camp 
in Sicily, he threatens to decapitate Christians, attacks an aid worker, and 
commits arson. Even though he is prosecuted, Tunisian authorities send, 
him travel documents and the Italians release him in June 2015. Yet Amri 
does not return to Tunisia but heads north to Switzerland only to later 
enter Germany under an assumed name. He steals, attacks a security 
guard and yet he walks away. In November, German counterintelligence 
informant VP01 reports that Amri has joined a cell under the leadership 
of the German ISIS commander, Iraqi Abu Walaa, and is preparing to 
buy a Kalashnikov. He has connections to Abu Walaa (also known as 
Ahmad Abdullah) through a Serbian-German citizen called Simeonovic, 
headmaster of the school where Amri studies as a refugee. The informant 
also reports that Amri is preparing for a terrorist attack. He is now under 
surveillance, including monitoring his conversations. He travels to Berlin, 
but in order to protect their source, the Germans decide to wait. After the 
attack, the press–with no or only belated rebuttal from the authorities–
refers to Amri as a non-religious, non-fanatic refugee who was radicalized 
in prison. However, if we connect the data provided by various sources, 
we can see at least two remarkable things. The operative cell, which Amri 
belongs to, has a link through a certain Abu Hanifa to the European chief 
of operations, Abaaoud. Moreover, Amri’s cousin, a member of Tunisian 
ISIS, maintains regular correspondence with Amri through the encrypted 
application Telegram–even before Amri goes to prison.
One of the perpetrators of the terror attack on the Bardo National 
Museum in Tunis, which claimed 22 victims, landed in Sicily as a refugee. 
The German police arrested the other one, but have not released his 
name. What we know is that he lived in Germany between 2003 and 
2013, and he returned there five months after the attack, in August 2015 
as an asylum-seeker. Both he and the perpetrator of the beach attack 
in Sousse with 38 fatalities received training at the Sabratha camp, the 
financing of which Abaaoud organized. We can therefore assume at least 
an indirect contact between Abaaoud and the Tunisian attackers. We 
should also add that, even though Abaaoud was a key figure in organizing 
and executing foreign operations, later interrogation and courtroom 
records show that he was always awaiting orders from two Tunisian 
commanders. One of them was Abu al-Tunisi, also known as “emir of the 
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foreigners,” commander of the foreign fighters, who was also named as 
the operative officer by the intended perpetrator of a thwarted attack 
on Dusseldorf. Due to source protection, Abaaoud’s other superior has 
never been named. Although the Sabratha camp may connect Abaaoud 
to the Tunisian perpetrators, the data available suggests that here, unlike 
on the map of the European attacks, he was not on the vertical axis of the 
network connecting ISIS high command to the operative cells. In terms of 
the Tunisian terror operations, Abaaoud appears to be a horizontal–that is, 
indirect–connection.
Ben Hassine, founder of the Tunisian branch of ISIS, may have recruited 
Seifeddine Rezgui, the gunman of the attack on the Sousse beach, who 
was killed on the spot. In the 90s, Ben Hassine lived in the UK and found 
a mentor in Abu Qatada, whose role the British High Court of Justice 
described as the intellect behind the operation, who had his “watermark” 
on every detail. Abu Qatada’s name will later resurface in connection 
with the attack on Manchester Arena. The other commander, according 
to statements made by arrested operatives, was a certain Chamseddine 
al-Sandi, leader of a terrorist cell, which had a vital role in both attacks in 
Tunisia. Rezgui organized his meetings with the members of the cell in cafés 
and mosques. One of them in the Sabratha ISIS camp also trained him.
The bomber of the Manchester Arena, 22-year-old Salman Ramadan 
Abedi arrived in the UK with his family as refugees of the Gaddafi regime. 
In 2011, his father and one of his brothers returned to Libya, where the 
services listed them as radical Islamists. His younger brother Hashim 
received charges for organizing a terror attack, maintaining contact with 
Salman, and having prior knowledge of the plans for the Manchester 
bombing. Libyan authorities reported that the brothers had a 15-minute 
phone conversation immediately before the attack. According to German 
police, Abedi returned to Manchester via Istanbul and Dusseldorf Airport. 
In the preceding days, as the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism 
reports, Abedi travelled to Sabratha in order to meet operatives of Katibat 
al-Battar al-Libi, the local ISIS terrorist unit. The same unit trained some of 
the Paris perpetrators and–as we have seen–the Sousse gunman as well.11 
The planning phase is likely to have commenced earlier: Abedi opened 
a bank account in May 2016, which he used, among other items, for 
financing the preparation of his TATP explosive. At the same time, there 
were reports of him visiting hardware and gardening supply stores.
Immediately after the bombing, police statements suggested that 
the attacker was highly likely to have been acting alone. An article in 
The Guardian speculated that Abedi was not a Jihadist but a vodka-
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intoxicated teenager. It soon became clear, however, that the Jihadist 
network operating in Manchester has its roots in Libya and Syria. Official 
sources said that Abedi was just a “mule,” a transporter, while someone 
else prepared the IED.12 French and British intelligence sources were 
leaked to the media claiming that Abedi had been to Syria, where he had 
connections to the Islamic State.13 Among his connections, it is worth 
noting Manchester university student Raphael Hostey, who recruited 
hundreds of Brits convincing them to fight for ISIS.14 Besides Hostey–
who left his family in 2013 to join ISIS, where he gained name for himself 
as Abu Qaqa– British journal The Telegraph gives Abedi’s network a 
comprehensive analysis.15 His friends included Abdalraouf Abdallah, who 
arrived in Manchester as a refugee, and who later received a sentence of 
five and a half years in prison for aiding former Iraq veteran Stephen Grey 
(who had also spent years in prison for terrorist activities) in travelling to 
Syria. After being shot and confined to a wheelchair in 2011, Grey lived in 
Abedi’s neighborhood in Manchester. 
The network also included Ronald Fiddler, also known as Jamal al-Harith, 
who joined ISIS in 2014 and died in 2017, when he drove a truck full of 
explosives into a Mosul army base. He also received a large compensation 
payout after his release from Guantanamo in the early 2000s. Another 
noteworthy Manchester operative was Abd al-Baset Azzouz, who left 
Manchester behind to build his own terrorist network in Libya with the 
guidance of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda. 48-year-
old expert bombmaker Azzouz had 200-300 fighters under his command. 
According to a high-ranking Washington official, intelligence sources 
suggested that Abedi had contact with Libyan Imam Abdul Baset Ghwela, 
famous for his radical line, whose son died as an ISIS fighter. Counter-
terrorism expert Raffaello Pantucci believes that the al-Qaeda-affiliated 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group consisted of combatants who travelled 
from Manchester to Libya as foreign fighters to join the uprising against 
Gaddafi. Later, some returned to the UK, forming the “British arm,” while 
others travelled on to Syria.16 However, the radical Imam Abu Qatada, 
who arrived in the UK in 1993 with false identification, and served several 
prison sentences, also affected Abedi. Authorities arrested him in 2001 
for the preparations of a bombing at the Strasbourg Christmas Fair–not 
that that was only terrorist activity he may have pursued. Still, for more 
than a decade, it was impossible to deport him from the UK due to 
several rulings by the European Court of Human Rights. According to an 
article in The Times, the imam was also an advisor to known terrorists 
such as Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid, whose names–though only 
indirectly–we have already mentioned in connection with the Charlie 
Hebdo gunmen. Later, in 9/11 organizer Mohamed Atta’s apartment, 
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Abu Qatada’s video was also found. Qatada underwent interrogation in 
February 2001, nearly half a year before 9/11. During a search, authorities 
found £170,000 in his home with £805 in a separate envelope inscribed 
“for the Mujahideen in Chechnya.”17
Regarding communications preceding the Manchester attack, it is worth 
noting how–besides Telegram and other less frequented encrypted 
applications–Abedi received additional support through Zello. This 
application had played a part earlier in the Istanbul attack on Reina Disco, 
although the primary communication channel of that operation had 
been Telegram. The design of Zello combines social media features with 
telephone and radio functions. It is available on smartphones, tablets and 
computers, and–a considerable advantage in certain regions–it operates 
reliably on low battery settings. Some messages suggest that organization 
of the Manchester bombing commenced as early as nine months before 
the attack. 
The FBI gained access to encrypted segments implying that Abedi had 
online communication with Syrian and US-based radicals, asking for 
advice on details such as the backpack for carrying the device. Authorities 
apprehended two other participants of these clandestine conversations 
weeks before the attack. In one such message, Abedi inquired, 
“Sheikh, I live in Manchester, in Great Britain. I live among non-Muslims. 
I have found work with them. Am I allowed to kill them? Is it permitted 
to kill them with a bomb?” The unidentified sheikh, who may have been 
an ISIS operative from Syria, responded citing the Quran: “Fight the 
pagans all together.” Another correspondent, US citizen Said Azzam 
Mohamad Rahim allegedly advised: “To the boy from Manchester I say, 
OK, kill them! Show no mercy to civilians.” 18 
Later, authorities arrested Rahim in Texas trying to board a flight to Jordan. 
Neither can we consider the Uzbek perpetrators of the attacks on St 
Petersburg and Stockholm “lone wolves.” Akbarson Dalilov, who killed 16 
and wounded 49 in the St Petersburg subway on April 3, 2017, received 
his Russian citizenship in 2011. In 2013, he attempted to travel to Syria 
via Turkey, but Turkish authorities arrested and deported him back to 
Russia. The 8-member operative cell he belonged to is likely to have been 
only a fragment of the 4000 radicals from Russia and the 5000 from 
the post-Soviet countries who have–based on Russian estimates–joined 
ISIS.19 Numerous fighters travelled to Syria from Kyrgyzstan’s second-
largest city, Osh. As an officer in charge of the investigation told Russian 
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newspaper Kommersant, Dzalilov may have been under the influence 
of a Syrian terrorist cell recruiting Uzbek nationals. The FSB arrested 
his training supervisor, Abror Azimov, after the attack. Four days later, 
Rakhamat Akilov, another Uzbek terrorist, who was also planning to join 
ISIS and was similarly deported back to Sweden by Turkish authorities in 
2015, drove a beer truck into a crowd, killing five. In his bag that he kept in 
the truck, police also found an explosive device.
MAPPING NETWORKS
We can see how, in a certain sense, it is possible to pinpoint the Jihadist 
network model in the strategy of both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. 
The network structure behind the recent, devastating European terrorist 
attacks exhibits unmistakable similarities to those characterizing 9/11 and 
other al-Qaeda operations, thoroughly researched by Krebs et al. We can 
clearly see the significance of early childhood connections or a shared 
area of living (which was most pronounced in the case of French cells). 
Similarly, to Mohammed Atta, who played a central role in the preparation 
of 9/11 by connecting minor cells to each other and to bin Laden, in this 
case Abdelhamid Abaaoud acted as a coordinator and liaison towards 
ISIS high command in the framework of almost all above-mentioned 
terrorist attacks. (Citing Abdeslam as the key figure stems from confusing 
his actual role in the network with the proportion of media coverage he 
received–due to the simple fact that police captured him alive. Otherwise, 
he was only responsible for logistics.) Blatant discrepancies and conflicts 
between al-Qaeda and ISIS (with the underlying disagreements between 
the Sunni “elite” and Sunni “proletariat”) may cause us to overlook the 
continuity and similarities in their methods. It is interesting to note that 
the network of the extremist left terrorist, Carlos, directed from Budapest 
between 1979 and 1984, showed a different structure.20
Often a city, town, or neighborhood serves as a network node for building 
personal chains spanning entire decades. A much-cited example, the 
Brussels district of Molenbeek became the focus of terrorist activity well 
before the 2016 Paris and Brussels attacks. Molenbeek was home, for 
instance, to the operatives who, disguising themselves as journalists, 
committed the assassination of Afghan Taliban commander Ahmed 
Shah Massoud ordered by bin Laden two days prior to 9/11. The two 
perpetrators of the 2004 Madrid bombings, which claimed 192 lives, were 
also Molenbeek residents.21 Some al-Qaeda veterans, who lived there, 
helped the ISIS-generation in traveling to Syria. Belgium, as a potential 
and desired target, already appeared in the al-Qaeda related documents 
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published by the West Point CTC. In one of the Sinjar documents, a certain 
Husayn mentions Belgium in his letter of 11 August 2007 as his destination, 
and he is already planning financing and network building: 
“As for the operations in Europe, I [the author / Husayn] have 
some [communication] lines. I even have someone that can take 
over and complete the work of Abu-‘Abdallah al-Baljiki [the 
Belgium]. Additionally, there is another person who works with 
me in gathering the funds over there. There are many brothers 
over there who want to work, however, over here, where you are, 
or in over there in Europe, if Abu-Qasurah wants to give me the 
addresses, I will call them. When I arrive, I can explain and clarify 
the matter better.”22
Such disappearance and reemergence of strategic-operative details under 
one guise/in one region or another may create the impression that they are 
particular to a specific era or organization. As an example, while AQI, the 
Iraq branch of al-Qaeda had some of their attacks carried out by women in 
the mid-2000s to intensify the psychological effect, there were indications 
in the last year that ISIS was also shifting towards female perpetrators.23
Expert views suggest that terrorist networks may be revived and 
reinforced in South Asia and Central-Asia, the former Soviet republics, and 
Libya. On Uygur terrorism, we have fairly limited public information. What 
we know is that the attacker of the Reina Disco in Istanbul, the Uzbek 
Masharipov received instructions from Rakka, but also had support from 
an Uzbek-Uygur cell from Anatolya, which was already preparing the plot 
for a second, similar attack.24 We know even less of the fact that “Uygur 
terrorist activities exist outside of the borders of China.”25 In Europe, some 
experts predict, returning “foreign fighters” may add to the numbers 
of radical Islamists posing a threat. Detailed review of these trends is, 
however, outside the scope of this article.
Krebs, and others, drew the map of terrorist networks primarily with 
regard to operative cells. For a more comprehensive view, we should 
also consider a different system of layers one that is significantly 
more difficult to pinpoint since it is integrated loosely, flexibly, and 
colorfully into society than operative units or the central core of terrorist 
organizations. In expert circles, there is increasing focus given to so-
called “virtual plotters”: master planners who design terrorist attacks 
through online correspondence. Police only later tied ISIS-member 
Rachid Kassim to two operations that they had thought were the actions 
of isolated perpetrators. Through his Telegram channel Sabre de Lumiere 
(Sabre of Light), he conducted more than half of the seventeen thwarted 
attacks in France, 2016.26
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We know little about the networks used by the Islamic State to sell 
oil, natural gas, or phosphate. It is also a question how, through what 
network of intermediaries they could find buyers globally for the valuable 
artifacts they also sold illegally for profit. We must therefore consider 
the peculiar interdependence and convergence between international 
organized crime and terrorist organizations–an issue that is too massive 
to tackle on these pages.
If our investigation concerns the present rather than the past, it is usually 
near impossible to provide detailed and unquestionable evidence of a 
state’s involvement in terrorism. A demonstrative example of the layered 
and overlapping nature of networks is apparent in the production and 
distribution of the drug Captagon.27 Both Abdeslam and one of the 
Tunis attackers may have been under the influence of this medication 
that, besides its analgesic, disinhibitory, and euphorizing effects, has 
the rare impact of triggering extreme and wild behavior. The Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant fighters commonly use it. Manufacturing 
counterfeit Captagon began in Hezbollah-operated Lebanese laboratories 
with considerable Iranian funding. In 2014, authorities confiscated 55 
million counterfeit pills in Lebanon, while they estimated the amount 
in circulation to be ten times that. Hezbollah and its leaders made 
tremendous profit through the illegal production of Captagon. Iran, on 
the other hand, supported this Hezbollah enterprise for purely political 
reasons: For them, the investment was a means of non-linear warfare 
(NLW). “Unlike the conventional definitions of hybrid warfare, NLW 
includes the infocommunicative, social and social-psychological toolsets 
that belligerents utilize indirectly, often through intermediaries and 
external agents, in a variety of ‘“battlefields.’”28 Schauffer’s demonstration 
of NLW focuses primarily on Russia’s distinctive methods of engagement. 
His microanalysis fits perfectly into István Resperger’s observations on 
asymmetric warfare:
“Careful analysis of the military conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine shows how Russians (partly due to international backlash 
and sanctions) mobilize their armed forces in “waves:” in close 
coordination with directly and indirectly planned operations 
and activities, but in small contingents. Success is the sum of 
“minor victories,” and the final outcome is the triumph of the 
comprehensive strategy.”29
The profit gained by the Shiite Iranian government from funding Captagon 
production was, in the long term, not financial but political: mentally 
weakening the Sunni population and destabilizing Sunni states. The 
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cooperation of terrorist organizations and states supporting terrorism is 
often rooted in bizarre or paradoxical motives: the principle of “the enemy 
of my enemy” is just one example. As Balázs Laufer pointed out in his 
highly nuanced analysis of the connection between the migration wave 
and the international terror threat:
“[...] immigrant groups tend to retain their (ethnic/religious/tribal) 
conflicts in the receiving country; that is, the migration of conflicts 
occurs parallel to that of humans. [...] This situation may result in 
a conflict of interests between foreign secret services or criminal 
organizations in the receiving country (such as a potential clash 
between Turkish and Kurdish immigrants in Germany).”30
From a network aspect, this means that counter-intelligence operatives 
may often face a chain of connections that has direct links to terrorist cells 
or radical Muslim communities, which, instead of their true purpose, may 
initiate contact under “false flags.” The network map should also include 
NGOs acting as umbrella organizations and, under the guise of humanitarian 
objectives, helping terrorist operations transfer funds, spread propaganda, 
or exert psychological pressure. These units also have connections to each 
other through distinctive ties. One example of the “umbrella” model of 
these NGOs was the well-known case of the ship Mavi Marmara (also known 
as the Flottila) in 2011, when Palestinian terrorists tried to enter the Gaza-
district under the cover of multiple “humanitarian” organizations.31
BREAKING DOWN THE NSS: 
Other peculiarities and redundancies are difficult to interpret. While 
propaganda targets potential “lone wolves” with its instructions, we 
have seen that all major European attacks were planned and carried out 
by operatives who had direct contact to the ISIS external operations 
command. It is hardly beneficial for secure preparation and conspiring 
if the organization publicly announces the target or the intended device 
prior to the attack–and yet that was exactly what happened in numerous 
cases. As pointed out by László Simon, in this case “indirect threats in the 
cyberspace have a negative effect on conducting traditional operations.”32
On Rumiyach, the Islamist forum replacing Dabiq, there was a piece on 
November 7, 2016, weeks before the Berlin attack, which advised “lone 
wolves” to carry out truck ramming attacks, discussing the advantages, 
recommending vehicles to use, targets to choose. At the time of its 
publication, Anis Amri was already busy preparing for his ramming attack. 
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Earlier, on the Telegram channel “Orlando” opened after the Orlando 
terrorist attack, authors specifically named Berlin as the city they advised 
“lone wolves” to target with their hits. In 2016, many ISIS followers 
shared the news that the next attack was likely to be in Berlin.33 After the 
successful operation, the propaganda for solitary attackers intensified. A 
Facebook user named Sufyan al-Khayyati addresses them with the words 
“Kill them, slaughter them, trample them, burn them, kick them, and use all 
means to kill the crusaders, whether they are civilians or military personnel 
[...].”34 Three days before the attack on Bardo Museum, one ISIS group in 
Tunis announced “glad tidings of what will bring you joy and bring joy to 
the Muslims in general,” while another group issued a similarly ominous 
announcement “interpreted as foreshadowing” the attack.35
Another example would be the attack near Würzburg, Germany on 18 July 
2016: the attacker, 17-year-old Riaz Khan Ahmadzai shouted “Allah Akbar,” 
and attacked five people with a knife and an axe, causing two of them 
life-threatening wounds. In a two and a half minute video made before the 
attack, he is holding a knife and threatening to hit “every city, town, and 
airport.” Although he arrived in Germany as an Afghan refugee, he was 
later thought to be older and from Pakistan. The press tended to refer 
to him as a lone radical perpetrator, while the German Interior Minister 
Thomas de Maiziere said his act was “perhaps half-way between running 
amok and terror.”36 However, there have been findings that contradicted 
this statement. Before the attack, Ahmadzai had contact with the Islamic 
State, and sent his video for approval to the ISIS secret service, the Amn-
al-Khajri (Amniyat). The Caliphate news agency Amaq had published the 
video where Ahmadzai introduces himself as Muhammad Riyad, soldier 
of ISIS. Based on the recording acquired by the Long War Journal, Kyle 
Orton, a researcher for the London-based Centre for the Response to 
Radicalization and Terrorism published a transcript of the conversations 
between Ahmadzai and an ISIS intelligence officer:
“[T]he Islamic State’s man asked: ‘What kind of weapons do you 
intend to use to kill people?’ ‘My knife and axe are ready for use,’ 
Khan replied. ‘Brother, would it not be better to do it with a car?’ 
the Islamic State plotter asked … ‘The damage would be much 
greater,’ he told Khan. But Khan was impatient, saying he ‘cannot 
drive’ and ‘learning takes time.’ ‘I want to enter paradise tonight,’ 
Khan explained.” [...] Ahmadzai was in contact with IS’s intelligence 
officer right up to the moment he began his terrorist attack. ‘Pray 
that I become a martyr,’ Ahmadzai wrote. ‘I am now waiting for the 
train.’ Shortly afterwards, Ahmadzai sent another message: ‘I am 
starting now.’ The Amn al-Kharji operative responded: ‘Now you 
will attain paradise.’”37
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CONCLUSION
However far-fetched it may sound, a hypothesis to consider is the 
possibility that announcing and adopting a strategy with lone perpetrators 
in the forefront may serve a double purpose as diversive propaganda: 
spreading fear and insecurity among civilians and misleading police and 
intelligence forces. This psychological operation is part of large-scale 
psychological warfare. Thus, feeding the legend of the “lone wolf” is 
probably a means of asymmetric warfare with the aim of maintaining 
control, keeping the enemy in the dark and provoking reactions.
The media, experts and politicians–including Europol and President 
Obama–for years claimed that the “lone wolf” posed the utmost security 
threat. However, Marc Trevidic, France’s chief counter-terrorism judge 
made the intriguing statement after his retirement that lone wolf attacks 
were used as a “smoke screen” that “served to put all our agencies on 
edge” and “allowed them to calmly prepare.” He also warned that while 
these attacks distract security forces, terrorist organizations are planning 
“huge atrocities” across Europe.38 
On a final note, it is apparent how the legend of the “lone wolf” as a 
terrorist propaganda device in the service of psychological warfare has 
become pervasive in European media. It could not have reached so 
many and become so widely adopted without the aid of political and 
civilian groups in desperate search for narratives to diminish the threats 
associated with the increasing waves of illegal migration.
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